By Syeda Duaa Zehra Naqvi
Europe’s semiconductor industry has emerged as the newest frontier in the global race for technological self-sufficiency. Yet, its pursuit of “strategic autonomy” has ignited tensions between economic cooperation and national security concerns. The recent freezing of assets belonging to Nexperia — a Dutch subsidiary of China’s Wingtech Technology — illustrates this growing divide between open markets and protectionist impulses in the name of industrial sovereignty.
In late September, Dutch authorities, citing national security concerns, froze Nexperia’s assets valued at approximately 14.7 billion yuan and removed Chinese shareholder control through judicial proceedings. This action, coming immediately after a major European Union declaration on semiconductor collaboration, has drawn global attention. For some, it reflects a broader European ambition to consolidate critical technologies under its own industrial framework; for others, it signals a worrying precedent where political motivations override commercial norms.
Europe’s Chip Ambitions
The European Union’s semiconductor strategy is rooted in the European Chips Act of 2022, which seeks to double Europe’s share of global chip production capacity to 20% by 2030. This ambitious plan, however, has struggled to gain traction. Major projects such as Intel’s planned megafab in Germany have faced delays, while other investments remain entangled in bureaucratic and funding challenges. Projections now indicate a modest increase in Europe’s chip output share — from 9.8% in 2022 to only 11.7% by the end of the decade.
Recognizing these gaps, the Netherlands spearheaded the creation of the European Semiconductor Alliance (Semicon Coalition) in March 2025, joined by Germany, France, Italy, and several other EU nations. The coalition aims to bolster semiconductor R&D, strengthen cross-border production networks, and attract global partners to revive Europe’s manufacturing base.
On September 29, all 27 EU member states signed a declaration at the Competitiveness Council in Brussels, reaffirming their commitment to build a resilient and self-reliant semiconductor ecosystem. The declaration, described by Dutch Economic Affairs Minister Vincent Karremans as “a milestone toward Europe’s strategic autonomy,” underscores the growing recognition that semiconductors are no longer just an economic asset but a pillar of national and continental security.
This renewed focus reflects Europe’s desire to reduce dependence on external suppliers amid an era of technological decoupling. Chips, once an invisible component of modern life, have become a geopolitical currency — essential for everything from smartphones and electric vehicles to defense systems and artificial intelligence.
The Nexperia Controversy
Against this backdrop, the Dutch government’s decision to intervene in Nexperia’s operations has raised eyebrows across the global business community. Nexperia, a key player in semiconductor production, has been operating in the Netherlands since its acquisition by China’s Wingtech Technology. The company has long served as a bridge between European innovation and Asia’s manufacturing strength.
Critics argue that the Dutch move appears synchronized with the broader European ambition to consolidate semiconductor assets under domestic or EU-aligned ownership. The timing — just one day after the EU’s semiconductor declaration — adds to this perception. For them, the decision is less about national security and more about industrial strategy: an effort to absorb high-value foreign assets into Europe’s technological framework.
The case also brings to the forefront the debate about the weaponization of judicial and administrative tools in economic competition. Governments increasingly invoke “national security” to justify interventionist policies, often at the expense of long-established international trade norms. This growing tendency risks eroding investor confidence and destabilizing the open-market principles that have long underpinned global technological collaboration.
From China’s perspective, such actions could fall under the purview of its Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, enacted in 2021, which allows countermeasures against discriminatory actions that violate international law or fair trade principles. Observers in Beijing see the Nexperia case not merely as a corporate dispute but as a test case of how China will defend its overseas assets amid tightening Western regulations.
Europe’s challenge lies in balancing its industrial ambitions with its global commitments. The drive for “strategic autonomy” is understandable — the pandemic and geopolitical tensions have exposed the vulnerabilities of global supply chains. But the approach must remain consistent with the EU’s long-standing advocacy of open markets, fair trade, and legal certainty.
The Netherlands, traditionally a champion of global commerce and innovation, now finds itself navigating conflicting pressures: the need to safeguard national interests while maintaining an image of regulatory predictability. The decision against Nexperia, while framed as a matter of security, risks signaling to investors that Europe’s commitment to openness may be conditional.
For Europe to succeed in its semiconductor vision, it must build trust, not barriers. Technological self-reliance cannot be achieved through exclusion but through partnerships, transparency, and predictable policy environments. Global collaboration — especially with economies like China that are deeply integrated into the semiconductor value chain — remains essential for achieving technological progress at scale.
Even the European Semiconductor Alliance acknowledges this reality. Its stated objectives include fostering international partnerships and encouraging joint ventures in research, design, and manufacturing. However, the Nexperia episode could undermine these aspirations by creating a perception of selective openness — where partnerships are welcomed in rhetoric but restricted in practice.
An Industry Demanding Global Cooperation
Semiconductors represent the pinnacle of global interdependence. No single country — not even the United States, China, or the European Union — can claim full self-sufficiency in this complex, capital-intensive industry. Production involves thousands of interconnected suppliers across continents: raw materials from Japan, design software from the US, lithography tools from the Netherlands, and fabrication plants across Asia.
In this interconnected ecosystem, unilateral actions under the pretext of “security” risk fragmenting the very networks that make technological innovation possible. As Europe, the US, and China all pursue semiconductor self-reliance, the global industry faces the danger of overlapping subsidies, redundant capacity, and rising costs — outcomes that could ultimately slow down innovation rather than advance it.
China’s role in this landscape remains pivotal. It is both a leading consumer and a growing producer of semiconductors, with its firms investing heavily in next-generation chip technologies, AI hardware, and power electronics. Collaborative ventures between Chinese and European firms — such as Nexperia’s prior partnerships — have historically benefited both sides, creating jobs, accelerating innovation, and strengthening supply chain resilience.
For Europe to achieve its technological aspirations, maintaining constructive engagement with China and other global players is not an option but a necessity. The future of the global semiconductor industry will depend not on isolation but on mutual trust, reciprocal access, and respect for international norms. Europe, with its tradition of diplomacy and innovation, is well-placed to lead by example — fostering a balanced model where strategic autonomy coexists with global collaboration.
About the Author:
Syeda Dua Zehra Naqvi specializes in geopolitics, European and South Asian affairs, and cybersecurity. She can be reached at duaazehra89@gmail.com
